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Can Metaphysical Structuralism solve the Plurality Problem?
Abstract
Metaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good 
theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical 
realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct
one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or 
explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of this paper is to
explore whether the notion of functionally equivalent theories can be extended and utilised in the 
defence of metaphysical realism, drawing upon themes from structuralism in the philosophies of 
mathematics and science in which the specifics of theories do not matter as long as the relations in 
which they stand to other theories are maintained. I argue that despite its initial attractiveness, there 
are significant difficulties with this proposal. Discovering these obstacles (most probably) thwarts 
the realist structuralist project, but reveals interesting features of metaphysical systems.
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Can Metaphysical Structuralism solve the Plurality Problem?
It is commonly, although not universally, acknowledged that there is a plurality problem in 
metaphysics; that is to say that in several areas of metaphysical enquiry there is more than one 
ontological theory which explains the phenomenon or phenomena under consideration acceptably 
well, not just in the eyes of its proponents but also in the opinion of those who would prefer an 
alternative ontology. These different theories often postulate different categories of entities and 
processes, invoke different primitives and rely upon different primitive presuppositions and yet they
seem, on some level or other, to be doing the same explanatory job; or, to put the point slightly 
differently, the theories appear to be performing the same metaphysical function with different 
content.
The debate which has followed this observation has focused on various issues, such as 
whether plurality of metaphysical theories is a general problem in metaphysics or only concerns 
certain theories, and what the examples of plurality show about the entities postulated by the 
affected metaphysical theories and the interpretation of metaphysics in general.1 For the 
metaphysical realist, the pressing problems concern whether there is any way to determine which of
the alternative theories (if any) is the true one or whether all of them are, and, if we can not 
determine which theory is correct, what the best attitude to metaphysics should be.
In this paper, I will concentrate upon the plausibility of just one realist response to the 
plurality problem: that we can maintain realism despite the plurality of metaphysical theories 
available by adopting a form of structuralism. This is, I will suggest, a natural extension of recent 
work which argues that some metaphysical theories are equivalent to each other relative to a 
specific metaphysical question (Miller 2005b; Benovsky 2008, 2016; Allen 2012) and aims to 
generalise from that position. This strategy adopts an attitude towards metaphysical disagreements 
similar to that which has been proposed to defuse seemingly intractable ontological disagreements 
in the philosophy of mathematics or difficulties for realism brought on by theory change in the 
philosophy of science (Benacerraf 1965, 1973; Worrall  1989; Ladyman et al. 2007). Perhaps the 
categories of entities which theories postulate, or even metaphysical theories themselves, are 
ontologically significant only in terms of the relations in which they stand to other categories and 
theories. If this is the case, what matters to metaphysics is structure and not the nature of the entities
1 These discussions are too wide-ranging to be covered in detail here. See, for instance, Chalmers et al. 2009; Tahko 
2015.
2
Draft Copy – Please do not quote. Sophie R Allen
and primitive relations between them which are postulated by specific theories. If successful, this 
project would permit the reconciliation of metaphysical realism with the plurality of theories on 
offer; the structure, but not the entities and theories it relates, is real. 
However, although I think that metaphysical structuralism is an option worth exploring, I 
will argue that ultimately it is an unconvincing way to defend realism. Despite this outcome, its 
failure illuminates some interesting features of metaphysical theorising and the connections 
between theories, in addition to narrowing down the options for realist construals of metaphysics. 
I will begin by briefly sketching some examples of plurality in section 1 before considering
what is meant by equivalence of metaphysical theories. This discussion reveals some important 
differences between metaphysicians with respect to both evidence and method, as well as 
disagreements about what counts as equivalence between theories. Having noted these and how 
they constrain putative equivalence claims, I will move on to investigate whether metaphysical 
structuralism is viable when theories are locally equivalent. I will suggest four reasons why it is not.
1. Plurality in Metaphysics
Examples of plurality abound in the literature – some more controversial than others – and so I shall
mention just a few for the reader who is unfamiliar with the problem. But in this article I will not 
rigorously argue that these are in fact cases in which multiple metaphysical theories explain the 
same phenomenon or phenomena. These arguments have already appeared elsewhere and I will take
that to be sufficient for the purposes of this discussion. In the next section I will also explore some 
reasons why philosophers have differing opinions about whether there are cases of plurality or not.
First, theories of objective similarity and difference can be framed in terms of universals 
(transcendent or immanent), different theories of tropes, resemblance classes or theories of 
primitive properties. There is good reason to think that many mature versions of these ontological 
theories are equally good at explaining what makes distinct particulars the same or different (or at 
least appear to be so), despite the different ontological categories and associated metaphysical 
apparatus which they employ.2 
2 The restriction to ‘mature’ theories is important, since early versions of theories may be deficient in various ways 
which can be remedied. See Allen 2016 for a survey of these theories of properties; an argument that some of them 
are equivalent is made by Benovsky (2008, 2013) and the claim that the differences between them are not 
ontologically significant appears in Hirsch 1993. Even Armstrong (1997, 167-8) concedes that theories of tropes 
and of immanent universals have little to choose between them.
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Second, mereological theories of composition give varying accounts of when many things 
make up one: the nihilists say that they never do, universalists assert that every collection of simples
composes a novel entity, while some theories attempt to give an account in which only some 
collections compose novel objects and others do not. On the latter theory, the collection of atoms 
currently asleep on my sofa composes a cat, while the collection of atoms which includes my cat’s 
front left paw, the pizza in my fridge and Jupiter’s moon Ganymede do not. Despite the differences 
in the claims which these theories make about what there is in the world, they each provide an 
explanation of the same intuitive and scientific data by which we attempt to measure the worth of 
our metaphysical theories, as well countering or explaining away the objections presented against 
them. Thus, for instance, the nihilists explain away the appearance of composite objects (Rosen and 
Dorr 2002), while the universalists attempt to explain why some composite objects seem so much 
more important than others.3 
A third example of prima facie plurality is to be found among the different theories which 
explain the relationship between properties and laws of nature: in some theories, dispositional 
properties determine causal or nomic relations and thereby ground the existence of general causal 
laws; while according to other theories, the laws are ontologically more primitive than properties 
(and perhaps also more primitive than the things which instantiate the properties).4 The ‘properties 
first’ view includes various forms of dispositionalism about properties, while the ‘laws first’ view 
includes ontic structural realism (in its various forms). In other theories, neither laws nor properties 
are ontologically prior, such as in the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong account of laws as necessary 
second order relations between universals. Although these theories disagree about what grounds 
what, they agree about the range of ontological categories which exist and what, in combination 
with each other, these categories do. Each theory provides an account of causal or nomic relations 
and objective similarity and difference.5 
A fourth example is given by Kristie Miller (2005a), Eli Hirsch (2005, 2009) and McCall 
and Lowe (2006) who argue that there is nothing to choose (except perhaps terminology6) between 
endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence. It is plausible to think of 3-dimensional entities 
3 See Bennett (2009) for discussion of this case.
4 See, for instance, Allen 2012, Chakravartty 2017. There are of course alternative accounts of laws and properties, 
such as the broadly Humean Best Systems Analysis, which do not obviously appear to be equivalent.
5 In some sense, seeing the prima facie equivalence between these versions of properties and laws requires, to some 
extent, accepting the equivalence of the various ontological accounts of properties discussed previously. It is 
precisely this kind of combination of equivalent metaphysical theories which will be the topic of this article.
6 Although I use some of Eli Hirsch’s examples, I do not think that the ontological realist gains by treating 
ontological disputes as disagreements about terminology. I will save a critique of Hirsch’s position another 
occasion, however.
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enduring through time or 4-dimensional entities as having temporal parts and being extended 
through time. Both theories appear to answer the question of what persistence is equally well and it 
is not obvious how one should choose between them.
If one looks at the historical development of the above examples, the theories involved 
often start out as genuinely distinctive positions, but as they are adjusted to take objections into 
account and to better fit experiential and intuitive evidence, they begin to cover the same 
explanatory ground equally well.  The process by which metaphysical theories are brought into 
harmony with each other has been called ‘difference minimisation’ by Karen Bennett (2009) and it 
leads to seemingly very different ontological theories matching each other in explanatory strength. 
Difference minimisation is not an inevitable process – some metaphysical theories remain as 
outliers which are not candidates to be treated as equivalent with any others – but the pull towards 
maximal explanatory power with minimal counterexamples does tend to encourage philosophers to 
produce theories which can each account for the same range of phenomena and this is where 
plurality appears. 
The response to plurality has been extensive and varied. For some realist metaphysicians, 
the challenge is to determine which of the theories is the correct one and to argue its corner, or else 
to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility about the way the world is in the face of metaphysical 
stalemate. Others recommend an anti-realist or instrumentalist understanding of the categories and 
dependency relations which the respective theories postulate. One might, however, take the 
similarities between the theories to indicate metaphysical equivalence between them, at least in 
some important respects. But what would the implications of such equivalence be? Accepting that 
theories are equivalent might permit one to dismiss the debate as purely terminological – a move 
which is amenable to both realists and non-realists alike, since we are on this view just using 
different words to talk about the same things – or one might use this position to take a more robust 
anti-realist stance about the entities which our theories postulate. Alternatively, one might marshal 
this metaphysical equivalence between theories in defence of realism in order to argue for 
metaphysical structuralism: equivalence between metaphysical theories might allow us to overlook 
the specific ontological differences between different theories which explain the same phenomena 
in favour of concentrating upon the important relations which they determine between (for instance)
similarity, causality, modality, meaning and so on. Such an account could turn out to be an 
ontologically satisfying way to preserve metaphysical realism, albeit realism about structures rather 
than the entities which they relate, and such a move would also capture the sense in which plurality 
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does not seem to matter that much in metaphysics, even for realists, in the areas in which it occurs. 
Moreover, a metaphysical structuralist approach to realism would still be plausible if plurality of 
metaphysical theories turns out not to be a general metaphysical problem but one which only affects
certain areas of enquiry. In cases where only one theory seems viable, we could either allow that 
there may be alternative equivalent theories which we have not yet formulated and give a 
structuralist account of the theory in question, or we might simply accept realism about the entities 
of that particular theory while retaining the emphasis on its relations with other theories. 
2. Dimensions of Difference
2.1 Metaphysical Equivalence
So far, there has been rather loose talk of there being a plurality of metaphysical theories, and of 
metaphysical theories being equivalent to each other. But what does that amount to? Before we can 
embark upon a discussion of the plausibility of structuralism in metaphysics, we need to be more 
precise about what equivalence or near equivalence between metaphysical theories is. (‘Near 
equivalence’ is included in this discussion because one might want to accept that distinct 
metaphysical theories are all serious contenders to explain a certain phenomenon without making 
any philosophical or formal claims of equivalence between them; that is, one might accept that there
is a problem of plurality and that the theories involved are in some sense interchangeable without 
accepting that the theories involved are equivalent. I will keep the notion of ‘near equivalence’ 
deliberately vague for that reason.) 
Although we have, roughly speaking, distinct theories which characterise the same 
pretheoretical subject matter (such as the persistence of objects, or the nature of similarity and 
difference), the alternative theories involve complicated systems of ontological categories and 
dependency relations between them which do not correlate with the categories and relations 
postulated by other theories in any obvious way. There are, for instance, obvious differences 
between a theory which says that individual objects are bundles of tropes bound by a fundamental 
compresence relation and one which characterises them as being instantiations of universals 
inhering in a substratum. These two theories say different categories of entities exist which relate to 
each other in different ways. Yet, one might argue that these theories are equivalent to each other 
(Benovsky 2008), or else claim that the differences between the theories are irrelevant in such as 
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way that accepting one rather than another is largely a matter of choice (Allen 2016, 97). On what 
grounds are such equivalence (or near equivalence) claims being made? Some clarification is in 
order. 
 First, it is important to note that there are ontological and epistemological conceptions of 
theoretical equivalence. On the ontological conception, there is a fact of the matter about whether 
theories are equivalent, whether or not we can determine that they are; in the manner of constitutive 
identity criteria for entities, there are equivalence criteria for theories. (One might want to call these 
constitutive equivalence criteria identity criteria, but I will opt not to do that in order to maintain 
some conceptual distance between equivalence and identity. One might, for instance, want to argue 
that there can be equivalent theories which are not identical because they utilise different 
terminology, or postulate different primitives or categories of entities, or have different internal 
structure.) On the epistemological conception, theories are equivalent to each other if more than one
theory fits the evidence in the requisite way. One could draw an analogy between this epistemic 
conception of theoretical equivalence and Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) account of scientific theories 
being ‘empirically equivalent’ to each other; that is, there being distinct theories which explain the 
observable evidence while disagreeing about which unobservables there are. Theories are 
empirically adequate when they ‘save the phenomena’; that is, they account for the evidence just as 
well. But, in the context of metaphysics, what counts as evidence for a theory is another rather 
controversial matter. I will postpone discussion of that until the next section, and consequently 
delay discussion of the epistemic conception of metaphysical equivalence. 
If we consider constitutive criteria, there are roughly speaking two ways in which the 
equivalence of metaphysical theories could be characterised: one might accept that theories (or 
entities, primitives and so on) are the same if they do the same thing, or one might distinguish them 
in virtue of their nature or content. With this in mind, we can borrow a distinction from Jiri 
Benovsky between different conceptions of ontology: the Content View (the conception of 
something according to its nature) and the Functional View (the conception of something according 
to what it does). Benovsky (2013, 346) draws this distinction between different conceptions of the 
primitives of a theory, entities which, he argues, are postulated as problem-solvers to fill 
explanatory gaps in a theory and which are not themselves open to analysis. Examples of such 
primitives include compresence (in trope theory) which binds tropes into particular objects, or some
versions of the instantiation ‘relation’ in virtue of which instances of universals are exemplified by 
particular things. It seems plausible to say that compresence in trope theory and substratum in some 
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accounts of universals and particulars are distinct on the content view, and yet coincide on the 
functional view; insofar as we care about what these primitives do, they are the same since they 
bind or coalesce whichever entities play the properties role (or their instances) into distinct 
particular individuals.  
It seems plausible to suggest that we could extend the application of these two conceptions 
of equivalence from the primitives to other elements of the ontology, such as categories of entities 
and theories. Thus, for instance, we can think more broadly about the function of a theory as a 
whole (explaining similarity and difference, or persistence, or composition) and its content, or about
the function or the nature of the entities and processes it involves. (We should emphasise, however, 
that the conceptions are not mutually exclusive: it may be that the nature of an entity is its function, 
in which case the Content View and the Functional View coincide.7)  
Within these broader categories of metaphysical function and content, one might have 
different views about what counts as sharing a function or what determines similarity of content, 
leading to differing accounts of how we should individuate ontology and consequently when it is 
permissible to treat a category or theory as equivalent or nearly equivalent. For instance, if we are 
interested in determining sameness of content, some might be happy with extensional equivalence, 
while others would require finer-grained intensional or hyperintensional individuation to underlie 
claims of equivalence.8 Clearly, the more restrictive the criterion of equivalence one accepts, the 
less likely it is that theories will turn out to be metaphysically equivalent to each other. For instance,
those who accept a hyperintensional account of theoretical equivalence, such as theories being 
equivalent if they are true in all the same possible and impossible worlds9, are much less likely to 
encounter instances of plurality than those who advocate extensional equivalence, and consequently
may not accept that cases of plurality ever occur. Those who accept intensional equivalence are 
more likely than the hyperintensionalists to encounter metaphysical equivalence, but the theories 
which turn out to be equivalent on their view may still be restricted to rather trivial cases (such as 
the translations of a French theory into English, for example10). Thus, it is unsurprising that the 
primary basis for most claims of metaphysical equivalence between theories – including those 
7 For instance, this would be the case with accounts of properties or mental states which treat them as being entirely 
exhausted by their function. My view diverges from Benovsky’s here because he defines ‘content’ in opposition to 
‘function’ as ‘a nature which is not functional’ (2013, 345). I prefer to avoid this opposition if I can.
8 See, for instance, Miller 2017 which replaces her earlier view (2005b) that inter-translatability is sufficient for 
metaphysical equivalence. 
9 I am using the talk of impossible worlds as a façon de parler, although one can try to characterise impossibility in 
modal realist terms (Yagisawa 1988).
10 There may be reasons to deny that theories translated between languages are content equivalent, but I will not 
pursue this matter here. 
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discussed so far – is their functional equivalence, rather than equivalence of content: if two theories 
explain the same phenomena, or the entities, relations and primitives of the respective theories 
combine to produce the same effects (either explanatorily, or ontologically in terms of the entities 
they ground11), they count as equivalent on the functional view. Any differences in content between 
them are irrelevant to their explanatory power relative to a specific phenomenon.  
We have to be careful here to relativise functional equivalence in this way to the 
explanation of a specific phenomenon or phenomena. Two theories are functionally metaphysically 
equivalent with respect to a specific explanandum (or set of explananda) if they do the ‘same 
overall [explanatory] job’ but also, Benovsky adds ‘in the same way relevantly to an apt level of 
analysis’ (2013, 351). These latter caveats are added in order to avoid very general equivalence 
claims, such as the equivalence of Locke’s materialism and Berkeley’s dualism (say) on the basis 
that there is only a difference in content between matter and spirit, but they add an awkward 
vagueness to the criterion which it might have been preferable to avoid. A reasonable level of detail 
is required for the equivalence claim to avoid triviality. 
I will not pause to consider the merits of these different criteria here, since they are 
somewhat tangential to the discussion at hand and it is enough to acknowledge the difference that 
they will make to the existence of cases of plurality. Furthermore, in actual cases of metaphysical 
disagreement, the conception of equivalence in play is more often the epistemological one: there are
cases in which metaphysicians arrive at competing theories on the basis of the same evidence and 
the same methodology; and given that, there are no grounds upon which one can make a principled 
choice between the theories. 
2.2 Metaphysical Evidence and Metaphysical Methodology
In metaphysics, the relationship between theory and evidence is more complicated than in science 
(although I don’t mean to suggest that the scientific case is straightforward), since there is a wide 
range of views both about what constitutes acceptable evidence and about which methods may be 
deployed to formulate a theory on the basis of that evidence. Following Anjan Chakravartty (2017, 
ch. 2 and ch. 3), we can talk about philosophers adopting different epistemic stances towards 
metaphysical theorising which involve commitments to types of evidence and methods and which 
can be plotted along something of a spectrum as a greater variety of evidence and methods are 
11 I am using ‘ground’ in a very wide sense here to mean ‘determine the existence of’.
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permitted.12 At one end of that spectrum, a strict logical empiricist will only accept the evidence of 
experience, and perhaps also mathematics and deductive (and, more controversially, inductive) 
logic. Those who are committed to naturalised metaphysics consider evidence and methodology to 
be legitimate in metaphysics if they are also legitimate in science13; they may also restrict what 
counts as a legitimate metaphysical explanandum to questions which arise specifically in science or 
which arise out of anomalies in scientific theories. (For instance, Ladyman and Ross 2007.) Further 
along the spectrum, others might accept common-sense (and other) intuitive data, substantive 
synthetic a priori claims and more ‘relaxed’ forms of reasoning including inference to the best 
explanation applied to metaphysical hypotheses (if this has not been admitted already), 
conceivability arguments, intuitive inclinations, or imaginative speculation.14 Theories which are 
indistinguishable with respect to one evidential basis may be distinguishable with respect to 
another: logical empiricists may agree that there is no basis upon which to choose between theories 
T1 and T2, while someone who accepts greater involvement of a priori reasoning in their 
metaphysics, or permits more ambitious inferences from the evidence might find a basis upon 
which they might be distinguished. 
Thus, on its epistemic conception, it makes sense to talk about metaphysical equivalence 
only given an agreed epistemic stance concerning how metaphysical inferences should be made and
justified. Philosophers engaged in a dispute need not accept each other’s stances; but claims of 
metaphysical equivalence should be regarded as acceptable only relative to a particular epistemic 
stance. I will leave as an open question whether there is a ‘most permissive’ epistemic stance which 
encompasses all the evidence types and forms of justification included in the others. If this were the 
case, and if theories were equivalent relative to that over-arching ‘super-stance’ (as one might call 
it), then one might argue that on the epistemic conception they are metaphysically equivalent tout 
court. 
In what follows, I will treat the epistemic conception of theoretical equivalence as being 
the one which matters from the point of view of formulating and comparing metaphysical theories. 
From the point of view of being able to comparatively evaluate the merits of respective theories, a 
point of difference between them cannot make a difference if we are unable to discern what that 
12 Nothing in my argument will require the truth of Chakravartty’s voluntarist claim that adopting one epistemic 
stance rather than another is a matter of choice.
13 Whether naturalised metaphysics is equivalent to logical empiricism will depend upon one’s account of scientific 
evidence and methods, but most naturalised metaphysicians would consider their evidence base and methodology to
be broader than that of most logical empiricists, at least because they have a direct realist conception of at least 
some empirical evidence and include inference to the best explanation as an acceptable form of reasoning. 
14 One might also include assessment in terms of theoretical virtues.
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difference is. Metaphysical equivalence as I will be using it is therefore unashamedly an epistemic 
notion: theories are equivalent relative to a specific epistemic stance because utilising the methods 
and evidence which that stance allows does not permit our being able to rule one theory out in 
favour of the other. Therefore it is best to interpret the examples sketched in the first section as 
saying that given a shared epistemic stance (and thus a shared evidential basis), the theories 
considered are functionally equivalent. Furthermore, given that the examples are drawn from areas 
of metaphysics which are quite permissive about methods of metaphysical justification, the theories 
will remain equivalent according to all epistemic stances which accept fewer types of evidence and 
fewer methods (presuming, of course, that such theories can be formulated on the basis of those 
narrower stances). 
But why choose functional equivalence as the relevant relation? Perhaps the metaphysical 
realist could insist upon content deciding between functionally equivalent theories. However, since 
content is by definition not playing a significant explanatory role, it is difficult to see how 
differences in content would permit a choice between theories to be made on the epistemic 
conception of equivalence under consideration. (Even if the evidence base includes intuitive 
inclinations towards ontological categories, this will not provide grounds for choice within a shared 
epistemic stance since such inclinations are an individual matter: someone might reject tropes 
because compresence seems incoherent to him, while someone else may have no difficulty in 
including tropes in her favoured ontology.) 
Plurality of metaphysical theories begins as an epistemic problem, arising when the 
epistemic resources to decide between theories run out, but it is not inevitably an ontological one. 
From a realist perspective, although we cannot determine which theory is the correct one, it may be 
the case that the epistemically equivalent theories are not ontologically equivalent: there may be a 
correct theory, but we will never know (or be justified in believing) which theory this is. Realists 
still have two options: they could accept a version of Kantian humility with respect to which 
metaphysical theory is the correct one and what we can justifiably believe about the nature of the 
world15; or they could simply be ambivalent about the problem and accept that somehow the 
categories and structures of any and all of the theories somehow latch onto whichever entities and 
processes constitute the world.16 
15 This attitude is typified by Lewis 2009.
16 This option was suggested by Richard Woodward (in conversation) and is subtly different from humility in that it 
takes a relaxed view of the relationship between theories and the world. It does not permit strict reference relations 
between predicates and the entities which the world contains: we can be realists about any of the theories. 
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However, these options are unlikely to be attractive to ontological realists since it is a 
consequence of accepting them that we cannot take our metaphysical theories literally any more; 
metaphysical theories do not tell us what the mind-independent world is like in a robust sense. 
Acceptance of a perdurantist account of persistence does not, for instance, tell us that objects do 
persist by perduring, nor does a mereological universalist theory of composition tell us that there 
really is an object composed of my computer and my desk. This is an unsatisfactory result for 
ontological realists since they would have to relinquish their commitment to the claim that our 
theories literally tell us which categories of entities and processes there are (to a suitable degree of 
accuracy) in favour of accounts which either treat the nature and structure of the world as noumenal
or which accept that once we have exhausted the means to decide between theories, any theory tells 
us how the world is.17 If one cares about this, neither humility nor ambivalence are the right 
attitudes to adopt to the plurality problem.
3. Metaphysical Structuralism and its Limits 
The foregoing discussion clarifies, to some extent, the conditions required for metaphysical 
equivalence between theories and what is involved. One might, at this point, recommend that 
realism be abandoned in favour of some form of pragmatism or anti-realism, accepting that there is 
a point when, if we have used up all weapons in our epistemic armoury and still have a plurality of 
theories available, the ontology which they postulate cannot be treated realistically.18 But now we 
are armed with a clearer account of how metaphysical equivalence could work on a local level by 
taking the functional view of theories, it is tempting to extend this success to metaphysics more 
generally. Before the realist abandons his own position, he should at least explore the potential of 
applying a structuralist approach to metaphysics itself. It is to this project and the difficulties which 
arise that I will now turn.
17 Two further suggestions have recently been made to reconcile metaphysical plurality with realism: perspectivism 
(Agazzi 2016; Saatsi (forthcoming); Massimi and McCoy (forthcoming)) and dispositionalism (Chakravartty 2017, 
194-200). But both fail when applied to the cases under discussion, since they presuppose that the difference in 
theoretical content comes about as a result of different contexts, even though Chakravartty argues that the truth of 
the ontological explanation transcends that context. In the cases of plurality above, the plurality arises and the 
different theories are applicable across all the same contexts and so we cannot argue that an apparent difference in 
theoretical content is a matter of perspective, or that it arises due to the existence of dispositions which manifest in 
some contexts and not others (but are present (although not always manifested) across all contexts). There is more 
to be said on this point and I aim to take it up in later work.
18 See, for instance, Benovsky (2016) who uses the aesthetic properties of theories as a deciding factor between them, 
thereby giving an anti-realist account of metaphysics.
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The thinking behind metaphysical structuralism is as follows: we want a metaphysical 
account of similarity and difference (for example) and we have several functionally equivalent 
theories. Why (for realists) should multiple successes count as failure from a theoretical point of 
view? Furthermore, since the theories are functionally equivalent, one could be used in place of 
another and there would (by definition) be no noticeable difference, except in the internal structure 
of the theory which is primarily of interest to metaphysicians of properties. These theories answer 
the question of what a property is just as well as each other and they provide an account of the way 
properties relate to other categories of entities just as well as each other too. Each one can be used 
as the basis of theories of kinds, laws of nature, modality, meaning, types of objects, and in theories 
of other phenomena in which properties are relevant. (The resulting theories of these phenomena 
may be different for the respective ontological accounts of properties, but nevertheless explanations 
are available.) The situation is similar, one might add, to those in mathematics in which different set
theoretic axiom systems yield equivalent results. Moreover, one can characterise the ordinals set-
theoretically using von Neumann’s system such that each ordinal is the well-ordered set of the 
smaller ordinals, or in terms of the Zermelo-Frankel system where each ordinal is simply the set of 
the ordinal directly preceding it.19 For mathematical purposes, these make no difference and the 
choice between them is arbitrary. We can extend this observation to less obviously equivalent 
ontological accounts of the natural numbers as well such as those which treat numbers as abstract 
objects, formal symbols, or as mind-dependent entities such as ideas. What matters is not the nature 
of mathematical entities themselves but their relations to other mathematical entities. Furthermore, 
we might argue on this basis that mathematical structure exists prior to the entities which play a role
in that structure; that is, the structure is ante rem rather than in re. If we accept that the same is true 
in metaphysics and we can apply this analysis to the difference between trope theory and the theory 
of immanent universals, or resemblance nominalism, then another long-standing ontological dispute
is allayed. To generalise the point, what we are trying to capture with metaphysics are the relations 
between different metaphysical phenomena such as similarity, modality, meaning, composition and 
so on, the structure into which they fit; and we can construe this structure realistically even when 
we have more than one adequate account of the categories and processes which occupy the roles 
fixed by the nodes of that structure. On this proposal, we could then build upon local functional 
equivalence between theories to develop a broader metaphysical worldview, minimising ontological
disagreement along the way. That is the metaphysical structuralist’s aim. But does it stand up to 
19 Von Neumann’s version of the ordinals gives , {}, {, {}}, {, {}, {, {}}}, {, {}, {, {}}, {, 
{}, {, {}}}} and so on; Zermelo-Frankel gives , {}, {{}}, {{{}}}, {{{{}}}} and so on.
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scrutiny? I will discuss four main weaknesses with the project of generalising the notion of local 
metaphysical equivalence between theories to produce a metaphysical structuralist account of the 
metaphysics of the world. 
3.1 Primitives
The first problem arises even when we restrict ourselves to considering the local functional 
equivalence of theories. The difficulty here is that apparently functionally equivalent primitives or 
entities might, in some areas as yet undiscovered, behave in different ways to each other. For 
instance, Benovsky considers whether there is a difficulty about maintaining functional equivalence
between the theoretical primitives compresence and substrata on the basis that only the latter are 
able to exist independently. He concludes that there is not (2009, 2013) on the basis that this feature 
of substrata has no explanatory relevance to the theory of immanent universals and does not affect 
the functional equivalence between that theory and trope theory insofar as they provide an account 
of kinds of objects. The difference here is one of content, rather than function. Nevertheless, 
Benovsky concludes that cases such as this require us to acknowledge that equivalence claims 
might only be partial (2013, 350): the possibility that apparently functionally equivalent ontology 
could diverge remains and it is a possibility which keeps the equivalence claim applicable only 
within a specific explanatory domain where we can trace respective functional roles to make sure 
that they coincide. 
In principle, one might think that this could be done and is essentially an epistemic matter. 
For instance, in the example of the equivalence of trope theory and universals theory in the 
formation of particulars (which is founded upon the functional equivalence between compresence 
and substrata), one might think it unlikely that there is something that compresence can do which a 
substratum cannot which would not turn out to be a trivial difference, in the sense it would not 
make a difference to any other theories in which these primitives appear. But it is still an open 
possibility that functions could diverge and so as the scope of equivalence is broadened to include 
more theoretical structure, we need to distinguish cases of functional equivalence on a domain of 
enquiry from functional equivalence tout court. This project seems manageable when we consider 
primitives, since primitives are often ontologically quite ‘thin’: they are postulated to do a specific 
job, to play a specific explanatory role, and do not conceal a hidden nature which might turn out to 
possess hidden functional potential. They are usually, also, internal to the theory in which they 
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appear and do not have implications outside it. Nevertheless, concerns about the functional potential
of primitives being ‘hidden’ on a local level bring to light some related, but more serious, concerns 
about other implicit aspects of theories which might prevent widening the scope of claims of 
metaphysical equivalence. 
3.2 Presuppositions
Chief among these wider concerns is the fact that metaphysical theories involve commitment to 
presuppositions without which they would not be candidates to be viable metaphysical theories at 
all. Furthermore, these presuppositions concern areas of metaphysical interest outside the local 
explanatory focus of the theory in which they are used and these areas often, but not always, vary 
between theories about the same phenomenon. This can be illustrated by considering metaphysical 
accounts of the ontology of similarity and difference. For example, ontological commitment to 
transcendent universals involves commitment to the existence of abstract objects (abstract in the 
sense of their being objects which are neither spatial nor temporal), while the more plausible 
versions of class and resemblance nominalism require commitment to modal realism if they are to 
avoid the coextension problem. (Armstrong 1989, 50-1; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, ch. 5) It seems 
that although the theory of transcendent universals and that of resemblance nominalism are 
metaphysically equivalent on a local level, in the sense that they both adequately explain objective 
similarity and difference, the acceptance of one theory rather than another implicitly commits one to
specific metaphysical claims which a holder of the other theory might want to avoid. Not that, in 
this case, the presuppositions are in contradiction with each other, although one might want to be a 
resemblance nominalist precisely to avoid ontological commitment to abstract objects; while, on the
other hand, someone else might want to avoid resemblance nominalism on the grounds that it 
requires commitment to modal realism. 
According to Stewart Shapiro (1997, ch. 7 especially 228-9), another example of this can 
be found in structuralist theories in the philosophy of mathematics. In re structuralism in which the 
existence of patterns of existing objects determine the existence of structures requires the existence 
of sufficiently many objects to ground the structures of mathematics. It achieves this with 
ontological commitment to primitive logical modality which governs what could exist (it could 
resort to commitment modal realism at this point, but that would be a less popular and more obscure
option). On the other hand, ante rem structuralism is committed to the existence of structures, 
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whether or not objects exist to instantiate those structures. This involves presupposing the existence 
of abstract entities again, transcendental structures which can exist uninstantiated and which form 
the ontological basis of mathematics.  
The problem of presuppositions is both different from and more intractable than the 
question of whether functionally equivalent theories imply different versions of a theory of a related
phenomenon (when, for instance, different property theories imply different accounts of natural 
laws). In this latter case, the resultant theories may differ without this having any further 
implications for the overall metaphysical structure: there are simply alternative, yet functionally 
equivalent, theories explaining laws of nature, without this having a knock-on effect of 
metaphysical explanation beyond that. On the other hand, if the presuppositions required by two 
theories differ, then they are bound to fit into distinct metaphysical structures.
To put the difficulty here in general terms, theories T1 and T2 are functionally 
metaphysically equivalent with respect to specific local explananda, but because of the respective 
presuppositions P1 and P2 required to sustain T1 and T2, the wider structure in which T1 fits will 
be different from the wider structure in which T2 is embedded. Details which were functionally 
irrelevant on a local level, such as commitment to the existence of abstract objects, or primitive 
modality, or to possible worlds existing in the same sense as the actual one, are relevant when the 
wider metaphysical context of the theories in which they appear is considered. Unlike the case of 
primitives, these presuppositions are substantive, involving commitment to robust categories of 
entities or systems, and they have implications beyond the original theories for which they are 
presupposed. Different broader metaphysical structures may be determined by locally functionally 
equivalent metaphysical theories; plurality has reappeared at the level of structure and so it has not 
been successfully dealt with by shifting to a structural understanding of metaphysics.
One might suggest two responses to alleviate the severity of this objection. First, one might
attempt to minimise or to explain away the distinctive contributions which the locally functionally 
equivalent theories make to the broader metaphysical structure by drawing an analogy between 
metaphysical structuralism and structuralism in mathematics. In the mathematical case, the different
functionally equivalent accounts of number differ significantly in certain respects. For instance, as 
Benacerraf points out, the different set theoretic conceptions of number work just as well as each 
other and yet the Zermelo-Frankel conception is different from that generated by von Neumann’s 
axioms, and therefore different facts are true of the individual numbers. For example, on the latter, 
but not the former, it is true that three is a member of 17. Furthermore, if we examine other 
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conceptions of number amenable to the structuralist (on the basis that they produce functionally 
equivalent mathematical structures) further differences occur: the Fregean account of natural 
numbers considers them to be abstract objects and so, as in the case of the theory of transcendent 
universals above, accepting Frege’s account of numbers involves presupposing the existence of 
abstracta, whereas accepting a formalist or set theoretic account of number may not. But, in 
mathematical structuralism, these differences are not cause for concern; it is precisely because the 
functional roles of the numbers are all that is important to mathematics (if you are a structuralist) 
that the difference in the presuppositions embedded in a Fregean account and a set-theoretic account
of numbers is not relevant and we can simply account for mathematics in terms of structure.20 
Can we say that the same is true about presuppositions when we try to formulate 
metaphysics structurally? On a local level, it seems that we can agree with the tactics of the 
mathematical structuralists: the transcendent universals’ theorists’ commitment to the existence of 
abstract objects makes no difference to the account of similarity and difference in comparison with 
other theories of similarity and difference which differ in content and do not include that 
presupposition. But, as we begin to expand the metaphysical structure to include novel explanatory 
questions, the prior commitment to abstract objects places constraints on the structures in which the 
theory of transcendent universals can appear. The key move in the philosophy of mathematics was 
to point out that differences in content are not mathematically relevant, but a similar move cannot 
be made here. We cannot say that existential assumptions about the existence of certain categories 
of entities, or specific accounts of modality and so on are irrelevant to metaphysics because they 
are also part of metaphysics. There is no convenient ‘extra’ area of discourse in which to corral 
differences in theoretical content which have effects outside the local theory in order to get on with 
developing metaphysics. (It is worth noting that the mathematically irrelevant differences between 
accounts of number in mathematical structuralism (discussed above) are metaphysically relevant 
too.) In some cases, when we begin to consider the broader metaphysical picture, locally 
functionally irrelevant details matter, and their broader relevance to the respective metaphysical 
systems of theories in which they are embedded cannot be easily dismissed. The analogy with 
mathematical structuralism does not hold.
20 I am not advocating mathematical structuralism here nor intending to argue for it. The issues here are whether 
metaphysical structuralism is as plausible as mathematical structuralism, and whether metaphysical structuralism 
can respond to certain objections in an analogous way to mathematical structuralism.
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Second, one might suggest that the fact that T1+P1 implies structure S1 and T2+P2 implies
structure S2 does not matter because, if we expand the metaphysics far enough, there may be an 
overarching structure which captures both variants and within which they are functionally 
equivalent again, both locally (in certain respects) and globally. This overarching structure could 
sustain realism and again make plurality a trivial problem. But although this response may turn out 
to be viable in some cases, it is prima facie implausible if one hopes to use metaphysical 
structuralism to sustain realism. First: why would we have reason to believe that such an 
overarching structure exists? To find it credible, it seems likely that one would have to presuppose 
the existence of a metaphysical structure to the world, as one would no longer have good reason to 
believe that there is one on the basis of theories already formulated; and this move would be 
begging the question in favour of realism. Thus, realism remains a coherent position to hold, but 
one has to presuppose realism to sustain it. Second, since plurality has now appeared at two levels 
of metaphysics: at the level of first order theories explaining local phenomena and at the level of the
structures in which those theories stand when functionally defined, there is no reason to believe that
plurality will not strike again at the level of the over-arching structure. Once again, presupposing 
realism to escape this worry is an unappealing prospect and seems rather ad hoc. If one has realist 
inclinations in metaphysics, there are simpler and less ontologically committed ways to presuppose 
that one’s position is true. 
3.3 Holism
The difficulty in 3.2 that functionally equivalent theories T1 and T2 may respectively conceal 
distinct presuppositions P1 and P2 which have implications more broadly than the theory at hand 
has a counterpart which underscores quite how holistic metaphysical systems can be. This difficulty
concerns the subject matter of the presuppositions themselves as these too may involve commitment
to a certain type of theory; that is, theory T1 requires the truth of presupposition P1, but P1 is itself 
a disguised commitment to any one of a group of functionally equivalent theories. For instance, if 
T1 is resemblance nominalism, then P1 could be modal realism (which, as noted above, class and 
resemblance nominalism both require in order to circumvent the coextension problem). But there 
are several different theoretical variants of modal realism, not to mention some other theories of 
modality which reify possible objects in a way which would be consistent with class and 
resemblance nominalism’s requirements that possible members of classes exist in the same sense as 
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actual ones. Thus, in this case, we have a situation in which the presupposition required by a theory 
can be grounded in any one of a cluster of theories which take a realist attitude to possibilia.21 
While, for the purposes of underscoring class or resemblance nominalism, these theories are 
functionally equivalent to each other, and (perhaps) they may also be regarded as being so for the 
explanation of modality, they will each involve presuppositions of their own which, as described in 
3.2, will affect the broader metaphysical structures within which each theory can be a part. For 
instance, a theory which reifies possible worlds which are spatio-temporally isolated from the actual
one will occupy a different structure from a theory which reifies modal dimensions in the one actual
world alongside temporal and spatial dimensions.
This kind of phenomenon serves to illustrate a knock-on effect of how aspects of a theory 
which are locally functionally irrelevant to the theory (and which serve only to mark differences in 
content between it and other functionally equivalent theories) can affect the broader metaphysical 
system within which a particular theory is embedded. A theory can have non-local implications 
which it does not share with other locally functionally equivalent theories due to the presuppositions
it requires; and in turn the theories in which these implications are true have their own respective 
non-local implications; and so on to more theories. Theories which are functionally equivalent with 
respect to the answers which they give to a narrow range of metaphysical questions quickly cease to
be so when the specific ontological assumptions which ensure their coherence are considered. But 
the knock-on effect comes into play when these assumptions are each considered in their theoretical
context, where we would expect the problem of non-local implications to recur.  
Given the potential chains of implications which I have set up, it also seems possible that 
the presuppositions of theories could ultimately affect each other, either directly or through a circle 
of implications. For instance, let us presume that the presuppositions of a theory T3 require theory 
T4, while those of T4 require T3. Because the circularity is ontological and not epistemological, the 
existence of a circle does not matter in itself, but here we have a genuine case of ontological 
interdependence: T3 requires the ontology of T4 and T4 requires the ontology of T3. Although T3 
and T4 might each be locally functionally equivalent to a range of respective alternative theories, 
they can only belong in a larger system with each other; attempts to widen the scope of the 
equivalence further would fail. One fairly simple example of such circularity can be found in certain
21 I will not investigate whether there are any broadly speaking modal realist theories which would be problematic 
from the point of view of resemblance nominalism, since it would be rather tangential to the current discussion. 
Nevertheless, one might think that a theory which reifies a very wide range of possible worlds, including those with
non-standard logics and even impossibilia, would not be compatible with the role for which nominalists invoke a 
modal realist account of possibilia (to maintain extensional identity conditions for classes).
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accounts of concrete particular objects and events as being essentially spatio-temporally identified 
and individuated, a theory of particulars which thereby requires the existence of space and time or 
space-time. Although one need not be committed to a specific account of space and time to make 
this work, one might opt for a reductionist account of space and time in which space and time are 
entirely reducible to matter and change, which very quickly requires the existence of particular 
objects and events. This example of an ontological circle is a small one and could be avoided by 
taking on alternative ontological commitments such as a substantival conception of space and time, 
or a different account of the identity and individuation of concrete particulars, but it is nevertheless 
a coherent possible theoretical position to maintain and it makes two theories interdependent in 
virtue of the ontological presuppositions which they involve.22
Perhaps one could one get around this problem. Could we choose a theory functionally 
equivalent with T3 (let us call it T*3) and conjoin it with a theory functionally equivalent with T4 
(let us call this T*4)? Is the conjunction of T*3 & T*4 functionally equivalent with T3&T4? In 
terms of what these theories do, it seems the answer has to be ‘yes’, except when we consider the 
dependency relations which they postulate between the specific ontological categories which they 
employ. In this matter, T3&T4 involves internal dependency relations which T*3&T*4 does not, 
and one might feel that some significant metaphysical explanation is lost with the latter theory. 
After all, one might feel that one of the most important questions in metaphysics concerns such 
dependency relations, or to put it in Schaffer’s terms, ‘what grounds what’ (2009). On the other 
hand, one might be prepared to overlook the loss of this internal explanation and treat T3&T4 and 
T*3&T*4 as functionally equivalent with respect to certain metaphysical questions. Nevertheless, 
one would still have to tread carefully in expanding metaphysical theories into broader theoretical 
structures and this cannot be done on the basis of their respective local functional equivalence 
alone: one could not, for example, conjoin T3 with T*4, rather than T*3, since T3 would be 
inadequate without T4, lacking the truthmakers for a presupposition which makes T3 coherent.
These observations are unlikely to be news to metaphysicians who have thought about 
system-building in metaphysics in any detail, since when one tries to construct comprehensive 
metaphysical systems, rather than simply readjust local areas of theory, the extent to which the 
background of one theory implies another, which implies another (and so on) soon becomes 
obvious. What seem to be functionally equivalent theories on a local level, with respect to a 
22 I will continue to count the theories as two in the course of this discussion because they aim to explain different 
(and separable) metaphysical phenomena: particulars and space and time. I accept that once we are aware of such 
situations, one might prefer to consider the theories to be one larger theory, especially given what I have to say in 
the next paragraph.
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restricted number of metaphysical problems, are, on further inspection, embedded in very different 
metaphysical systems. 
The conclusions we should draw from this are that, local functional equivalences 
notwithstanding, metaphysical systems are frequently (if not always) holistic and that we cannot 
properly think of local theories as if they occupy nodes in an overarching structure because we 
cannot swap one theory for a locally functionally equivalent one without potentially changing the 
‘shape’ of the structure concerned. Functional equivalence of a theory within a structure should be a
formal matter – that is, a theory occupies the place it does only in virtue of the relations it bears to 
other parts of the metaphysical system (that is, what it is functionally equivalent to) – but these 
examples show that this is not the case. In part, this problem arises with metaphysical structuralism,
and not mathematical structuralism, because the latter can corral the locally functionally irrelevant 
content differences between functionally equivalent theories (which sometimes become functional 
differences on a larger scale) and treat them as metaphysically relevant but mathematically 
irrelevant and so as being irrelevant to the larger structure. Metaphysical structuralism does not 
have this option: everything in the theory is metaphysics and so it is, by definition, relevant to the 
structure which results from connecting theories together. As we synthesise theories which explain 
different areas of metaphysical interest, the result is not one structure but many, although that does 
not prevent our noting functional equivalences at each stage of the synthesis. Furthermore, theories 
which are functionally equivalent to each other on one scale are not functionally equivalent on 
another.
3.4 What is metaphysical structure?
Even if there are cases where the problems discussed in 3.1-3.3 do not arise, such that we find that 
there are structures in which groups of functionally equivalent theories stand in stable relations to 
other groups of functionally equivalent theories23, metaphysical structuralism faces a fourth 
problem: that it generates as many metaphysical problems as it solves.
Metaphysical structuralism was motivated in part by the promise of a mechanism which 
could retain realism in the face of plurality, removing the emphasis from the different ontological 
accounts provided by functionally equivalent theories in favour of seeing them as part of an over-
arching metaphysically explanatory structure. However, the advantages of this ontological 
23 This may be because they share presuppositions about ontology external to the theory, or they only rely on very 
minimal extra-theoretical ontological assumptions. 
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simplification are soon lost once we ask the rather obvious question of what the structure in 
question is. The answer to this question is likely to yield a resurgence of the very ontological 
disagreements which the adoption of structuralism was intended to solve, and consequently to 
reproduce the same problem of plurality.24
In response to this, one could decry interest in such questions and insist that metaphysical 
explanation can be brought to a halt at some point. But this move seems quite disingenuous when 
there appear to be legitimate metaphysical questions about why theories fit in the structures which 
they do and what those structures are, whether the relations between theories are explanatory, or 
something else (and if so, what that something else is), or whether they are explanatory and 
something else. Perhaps the dismissive attitude could be justified if we insist on the importance of 
understanding the similarities between first order metaphysical theories in order to put them to 
explanatory use and leave the discussion there. However, this strategy seems more pragmatic than 
realist in its motivation and is unlikely to satisfy realist metaphysicians.
Moreover, if one is defending structuralism in order to sustain realism, it seems difficult to 
deny that, if one is a structuralist, there is a structure there to be investigated. Refusing to ask 
further metaphysical questions does not seem acceptable from the realist point of view, regardless 
of whether this will lead to further difficulties with plurality. However, if we are permitted to deal 
with these problems with a plurality of structures by a further application of structuralism, there is 
some hope of stalling the burgeoning ontological disagreement at an early stage: along these lines, 
one might argue that if the different accounts of what a structure is are functionally equivalent to 
each other, then the differences in content do not matter. The plurality of accounts of the nature of 
structure would thereby be neutralised if we permit structuralism to be applied to the different 
explanations of structures themselves, and a potential requirement for more explanation (of the 
structure which explains the structures) could be avoided on the grounds that this is simply a 
demand for more of the same. We do not, if we adopt this strategy, halt the call for explanations in 
an ad hoc way, but we do establish that further explanations will not reveal anything interesting or 
novel.
4 Conclusions
24 Questions about the nature of structures have already been extensively discussed in the philosophy of mathematics 
and so I will not consider the details of the accounts which might be offered here. See, for instance, Resnik 1988, 
1997; Hellman 1989, 1996, 2001; Shapiro 1997.
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In this paper I have argued that the local functional equivalence of metaphysical theories is not 
sufficient to fit them into a broader system because locally functionally equivalent theories make 
presuppositions which, while functionally irrelevant at local level (i.e. part of the content), have 
distal effects on which other theories they can combine with. This implies that functional 
equivalence is indeed domain relative and that we cannot swap one functionally equivalent theory 
for another with the guarantee that the system will be preserved. This emphasises the holistic (or 
partially holistic) nature of metaphysical systems with the implication that we cannot take a 
structuralist view of the metaphysics of the world in order to sustain realism in the light of 
metaphysical plurality. Frequently, functionally equivalent theories belong in different systems, 
determined by the primitive assumptions which they involve, and one cannot resolve the differences
between these systems without presupposing that there is a single pre-existing metaphysical 
structure of the world into which they fit. Realism can be sustained, but only on the assumption that 
it is true, and so metaphysical structuralism does not resolve the plurality problem unless we are 
already assured that there is a grand over-arching structure into which our theories fit.
In the grander scheme of things metaphysical structuralism does not provide a general 
solution to the plurality problem for the realist because theories do not combine in the way in which
one might have hoped that they would. In contrast to structuralism in mathematics and (arguably) in
science, we are not capturing some over-arching, pre-existing structure with our theorising, but 
trying to construct explanations via the postulation of systems which are ultimately holistic in 
nature. What does this tell us about the nature of metaphysics? If plurality threatens realism, and 
structuralism cannot save it, then perhaps the best interpretation is some form of instrumentalism or 
anti-realism about the entities and relations between them which our theories involve. However, the 
other suggested realist solutions of humility and ambivalence remain on the table.
These observations do not harm findings of functional equivalence between theories at a 
local level, however. We can still talk about the functional equivalence of theories of similarity and 
difference, or particular object formation, or persistence, and so on. Nor does it prevent our 
combining functionally equivalent theories which explain one domain with theories which explain 
another; although each stage of combination involves taking note of the theories’ content in addition
to their functional role. We can only combine and assess theories into larger, more explanatory, ones
in a piecemeal way by doing metaphysics at every stage. Although there are explanatory gains to be 
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had from noticing the functional equivalence of theories, this move is not a methodological easy 
way out.25
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